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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 07-2641

POTOLA TUTISANI; BARDI KALANDADZE;
DAVID KALANDADZE,
Petitioners
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent

On a Petition For Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency Nos. A95-365-593, A95-363-594
& A95-365-595
Immigration Judge: Miriam K. Mills

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 9, 2008
Before: AMBRO, FISHER and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed July 24, 2008)

OPINION

PER CURIAM
Petitioners Potola Tutisani, her husband, Badri Kalandadze, and son, David

Kalandadze, are natives and citizens of the Republic of Georgia. Tutisani and her son
entered the United States without inspection on August 22, 2001, and Tutisani shortly
thereafter applied for asylum under Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 208(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a), and withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3), and the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.18,
claiming past persecution and alleging that she feared returning to Georgia because she is
Abkhazian, a minority ethnic group in Georgia.1 Tutisani and her son were served with a
Notice To Appear for removal proceedings on March 4, 2002, alleging that they were
removable under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as aliens present in
the United States without being admitted or paroled.
Tutisani’s husband was lawfully admitted on February 22, 1998 as a nonimmigrant
visitor for pleasure with authorization to remain until August 21, 1998. He remained
beyond that period without authorization and also was served with a Notice To Appear
for removal proceedings on March 4, 2002, alleging that he was removable under INA
§ 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), as an alien who remained in the United States
for a time longer than permitted. Tutisani’s husband and son were derivative asylum
applicants whose claims were based solely on her application.
In her asylum application and testimony at her removal hearing, Tutisani explained

1

An alien who is not in removal proceedings may file an asylum application with the
Department of Homeland Security. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(b)(1), (2) with
§ 1208.4(b)(3). Tutisani’s case subsequently was referred to an Immigration Judge.
2

that her husband is Georgian and thus their marriage is a mixed one. In 1993, after they
had been married for seven years, civil conflict broke out in the Abkhazian region and
300,000 Georgians were expelled as an Abkhazian separatist movement engaged in ethnic
cleansing. Several of her family members also were expelled. In turn, Abkhazians were
expelled from Georgia. Tutisani, who did not live in the Abkhazian region, was not a
supporter of the separatist movement but she was a vocal supporter of her people
nonetheless. The civil war in the Abkhazian region made life difficult for her in her
hometown of Rustavi. Her Georgian employer forced her to resign from her position at a
bank in October 1993. When her husband complained about the dismissal, the manager
told him to mind his own business and that he ought to have been ashamed to be married
to an Abkhazian. Tutisani further testified that her son was mocked at school because of
his Abkhazian ethnicity. His teachers mistreated him and set his classmates against him.
More than once he was beaten up by his peers.
Tutisani’s husband was terminated from his bank position in July 1996, three years
after she was forced to resign. In her asylum application, Tutisani stated that her
husband’s boss told him that he did not wish to employ trouble-makers who were married
to enemies of Georgia. Neither Tutisani nor her husband were ever able to find regular
jobs again. In addition to the loss of their jobs, she and her husband received telephone
calls, in which the unidentified caller threatened the family with death if they did not
leave Georgia. On February 22, 1997, after a celebration of her son’s birthday, Tutisani’s
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husband was brutally beaten by unknown assailants, and she was beaten as well. He
remained in the hospital for six days. In April 1997, the family moved to the village of
Bukistsikhe where her husband’s parents lived, and there they were finally safe from the
hostilities directed at them based on her ethnicity. Shortly thereafter, her husband
managed to obtain a visa and he came to the United States.
Tutisani was denied a visa, so she and her son remained in Bukistsikhe. In March
1999, because things had quieted down, she returned to Rustavi, but the threatening calls
started up again, and, on June 15, 1999, Tutisani was beaten by two men who used ethnic
slurs and stopped only when others appeared on the scene. Her son testified that, on
March 10, 1999, his arm was broken during a fight that started over the fact that his
mother was Abkhazian. In addition, three strangers tried to abduct him in September
2001. Tutisani and her son obtained fraudulent passports and Mexican visas and fled.
They were smuggled across the border near Arizona and then flew to Newark, New
Jersey, where they reconnected with her husband.
The Immigration Judge denied all relief on January 9, 2004, finding the allegations
of persecution incredible. Several inconsistencies were noted. Tutisani’s son testified
that he was involved in a confrontation over his mother’s ethnicity for the first time in
March 1999. He said that before that, however, he had a good relationship with fellow
students, and he was not mistreated by his teachers or other students. He did not recall
that his mother was ever beaten. Tutisani’s husband testified that when he was laid off by
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the bank, he was told only that staff was being reduced, and he did not confront his wife’s
employer about her forced resignation. The IJ also noted that there was a lack of
objective evidence that the civil war in the Abkhazian region of Georgia caused hostility
toward Abkhazians in other areas of Georgia and specifically in the family’s home town
of Rustavi. Furthermore, Tutisani’s only independent witness, a nurse who treated her
husband during his hospitalization following the February 1997 assault, testified that she
knew of no Georgians harming Abkhazians or members of mixed marriages, and she did
not have any first-hand knowledge of the source of Tutisani’s husband’s injuries. The IJ
thought it implausible that Tutisani would be targeted for persecution by Georgians, given
that she was not a supporter of the Abkhazian separatists. The IJ also found no
connection between Tutisani’s forced resignation and her husband’s termination. Finally,
the IJ concluded that, even assuming arguendo that past persecution was credibly
established, Tutisani could relocate to her husband’s parents’ village where she
previously lived safely.
Tutisani appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. While that appeal was
pending, Tutisani was selected as a Diversity Visa (DV) Lottery Program winner.2
2

Congress instituted the DV program to provides visas to individuals from countries
with low immigration admissions to the United States. Coraggioso v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d
730, 732 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c)). A diversity visa qualifies an alien for
permanent resident status, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), and, if an alien qualifies to receive a visa
under the program, that person's spouse and children under the age of twenty-one are
entitled to visas as well, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d). However, the total number of lottery
winners exceeds the number of diversity visas available. Thus, a lottery winner obtains
only the right to apply to receive a visa through the DV Program. Id. at 732.
5

Tutisani filed a motion to remand with the Board for purposes of adjusting her status
based on the DV lottery selection. On April 19, 2005, the Board adopted and affirmed
the IJ’s denial of asylum and related relief. The Board agreed that Tutisani failed to meet
her burden of showing by credible testimony that she was persecuted in Georgia or had a
well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Georgia, especially given the contradictory
testimony. Furthermore, she was able to live safely in another village without incident for
approximately a year. The Board remanded the matter to the IJ for further consideration
of the adjustment of status issue under the DV lottery program for 2005.
Ten days later, on April 29, 2005, notice was mailed to counsel of record, App.
127, setting a hearing date before the IJ for October 3, 2005. On September 9, 2005,
Tutisani, through counsel, filed a motion to advance the calendar hearing on her
adjustment of status application because the lottery program was set to expire on
September 30, 2005. App. 117. The IJ received the motion “at the last minute,” and
telephoned counsel on September 30, 2005 “to see what [they] could do.” App. 101.
Counsel informed the IJ that Tutisani was ineligible for adjustment of status anyway,
App. 101-02, and so the IJ convened a hearing on October 3, 2005. The IJ ordered the
family removed to Georgia, reasoning that “[r]espondent’s counsel has acknowledged the
respondents are statutorily ineligible for adjustment under Section 245(i), and,
accordingly, has not filed an applications [sic] for relief. Respondents have also rejected
voluntary departure based on their request to appeal this decision.” (Oral Decision of
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Immigration Judge, 10/3/05, at 2.) On May 2, 2007, the Board affirmed without opinion
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4). Tutisani and her family have petitioned for review.
We will deny the petition for review. We have jurisdiction to review final orders
of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). When the Board summarily affirms, the
decision we review is the IJ’s. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 245 (3d Cir. 2003) (en
banc). Under INA § 208(b), the Attorney General has the discretion to grant asylum to
"refugees." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b); see also Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 n.5 (1987). Section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA defines a
"refugee" as a person unable to return to her country of "nationality . . . because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . ." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A).
The alien bears the burden of proof of establishing that she is a refugee and that
she has suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of persecution. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(a); Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002). If past persecution is
established, then the asylum applicant is presumed to have a well-founded fear of
persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1); Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 312 (3d
Cir. 2007). This presumption may be overcome if the government can establish either
that "(1) '[t]here has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant
no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution'; or (2) '[t]he applicant could avoid
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future persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant's country of nationality . .
. and . . . it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.'" Id. at 312-13 (quoting
8 C.F.R. § [1]208.13(b)(1)(i)). If the alien cannot show past persecution, she may still
establish a well-founded fear of future persecution by demonstrating a subjective fear of
persecution, and that a reasonable person in the alien’s circumstances would fear
persecution if returned to the country in question, Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469
(3d Cir. 2003).
To establish entitlement to withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), the alien must demonstrate a "clear probability" of
persecution through the presentation of evidence that it is more likely than not that she
would be subject to persecution if deported. See Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123, 132
(3d Cir. 2003). This standard is more demanding than the standard for asylum, and,
therefore, an alien who fails to establish her eligibility for asylum "necessarily fails to
meet the standard of withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3)." Lukwago v.
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 182 (3d Cir. 2003). To establish entitlement to withholding of
removal under the Torture Convention, an applicant must show that "he or she is more
likely than not to be tortured in the country of removal." 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) & (4).
Adverse credibility determinations are reviewed under the substantial evidence
standard. Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Under this standard, the
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Board's credibility determination "must be upheld on review unless 'any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.'" Xie, 359 F.3d at 243
(quoting INA § 242(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). Although an immigration judge
must provide "'specific[,] cogent reasons'" for her adverse credibility finding, Dia, 353
F.3d at 250, such a finding is accorded substantial deference. We do not overturn a
credibility finding simply because we would reach a different conclusion. See Gabuniya
v. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2006). Section 101(a)(3) of the REAL ID Act
allows a trier of fact to consider any inconsistency, inaccuracy or falsehood in an asylum
applicant's written or oral statements, regardless of whether they go "to the heart of the
applicant's claim," but this provision "applies only to cases where the applicant
applied for asylum or other relief after May 11, 2005," and accordingly does not
apply to this case. See Chukwu v. U.S. Attorney General, 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir.
2007).
The evidence of record does not compel the conclusion that Tutisani met her
burden of showing by credible testimony that she was persecuted in Georgia or has a
well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Georgia. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a); Gao,
299 F.3d at 272. The IJ’s finding of contradictory testimony was supported by specific,
cogent reasons which relate to key aspects of her asylum claim. See Xie, 359 F.3d at 243;
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Tutisani's written statement and testimony were inconsistent
with the testimony of her husband and son. In her asylum application and testimony, she
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stated that her husband's boss told him that he was being fired because "he had an
Abkhazian wife." App. 250-51, 707. Her husband, however, testified that the only
reason given by his boss for his termination was staff reductions. App. 319. Her
testimony that her husband was indignant about her forced resignation from the bank, and
that he confronted her manager about the real reason for her dismissal, was in conflict
with his testimony that he did not say anything about his wife's forced resignation because
he wanted to maintain his position. App. 318.
In her asylum application, Tutisani stated that her son was mistreated by his
teachers in school and was mocked and beaten up by his peers due to her ethnicity, but
this statement conflicted with his testimony that he had a good relationship with his
classmates prior to the fight on March 10, 1999. App. 324. Furthermore, her son could
not recall any incidents where his mother, as opposed to his father, was physically harmed
on account of her ethnicity. App. 321-24. Tutisani’s only independent witness testified
she was unaware of any attacks against individuals on account of their Abkhazian
ethnicity during the nine years she worked at the hospital in Rustavi. App. 300-04.
In short, there was no connection between the conditions in Georgia and the most
disturbing events alleged, the July 1997 attack on her husband and March 1999 attack on
her son. Random incidents of violence do not constitute persecution, see Lie v. Ashcroft,
396 F.3d 530, 534-36 (3d Cir. 2005), and, although Tutisani contends that the violent
attacks, without protection or response from the police, were persecutory, she has failed
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to establish that the acts were “on account of” her ethnicity, id. at 535. Furthermore, her
other materials do not support her claim of mistreatment of ethnic Abkhazians outside of
Abkhazia or of mistreatment of couples of mixed Abkhazian and Georgian ethnicity by
ethnic Georgians. See Dia, 353 F.3d at 249 (adverse credibility determination must be
appropriately based on inconsistent statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently
improbable testimony in view of the background evidence on country conditions).
Neither the State Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Georgia nor
the Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions in Georgia indicate that
Abkhazians in mixed marriages were being targeted by ethnic Georgians, or that there is a
pattern or practice of persecution of Abkhazians in other parts of Georgia outside of
Abkhazia. App. 459-84. In addition, the Asylum Profile did not list asylum claims based
on Abkhazian ethnicity as a claim commonly seen from Georgian applicants. App. 46166.
We thus conclude that the record supports the Board's affirmance of the IJ's
adverse credibility finding in this case, and does not compel a conclusion to the contrary.
Because Tutisani has failed to present evidence that any reasonable factfinder would be
compelled to find that the testimony was credible, we must uphold the Board's decision.
See Abdulrahman v.Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 598 (3d Cir. 2003). Furthermore, insofar as
Tutisani failed to credibly establish her eligibility for asylum, she necessarily failed to
meet the higher standard of eligibility for withholding of removal under the INA. See
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Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 182. And, although credibility for asylum and withholding of
removal purposes does not defeat an alien's ability to establish her eligibility for
protection under the Torture Convention, see Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 476, denial of relief
was nonetheless appropriate here because the record discloses no evidence of the
likelihood of torture.
Tutisani contends that the IJ erred by excluding certain identity documents that
were not authenticated, but these exhibits were entered into the record and the IJ did not
base the denial of her application on the lack of corroboration of her identity. Therefore,
her argument on the exclusion of evidence lacks merit. Tutisani also claims that her due
process rights were violated by the IJ’s failure to schedule a hearing prior to the
expiration of the eligibility period for her diversity visa. Aliens have a "right to a full and
fair hearing that allows them a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on their
behalf." Cabrera-Perez v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). We
exercise plenary review over procedural due process claims. See Bonhometre v.
Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1184 (2006).
Generally, to prevail on a due process claim, the "alien must show substantial prejudice,”
see Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2006), but if the process provided was
not constitutionally deficient in the first place, the question of prejudice need not be
reached, cf. Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1044 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing Matthews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and observing that question of prejudice is separate
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from question whether procedure is constitutionally deficient).
We note that a hearing notice was mailed to counsel of record on April 29, 2005,
App. 127, and Tutisani waited until September 9, 2005, twenty-one days prior to the end
of the eligibility period,3 before moving to advance the hearing date. No plausible
explanation has been provided for this delay of over four months, which simply cannot be
attributed to the IJ. In any event, as to the adjustment of status issue, Tutisani cannot
show prejudice. The setting of eligibility dates for visa programs is not under the Board’s
or the IJ’s jurisdiction. Congress did not intend for the DV Program to result in issuance
of a visa after the end of a given fiscal year. See Coraggioso, 355 F.3d at 734. In order to
be eligible for adjustment of status under INA § 245(i), a visa petition must have been
filed on or before April 30, 2001. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). Since Tutisani’s application for the
2005 diversity visa lottery would have been filed long after this date, she was not eligible
for adjustment of status from within the United States. Her only recourse was to depart
the United States and apply for consular processing from abroad. See 22 C.F.R. § 42.61
et seq. She left herself virtually no window of opportunity by delaying the filing of her
motion to advance the calendar hearing until September 9, 2005. Notice of the hearing
date was sent well in advance of the end of the fiscal year.
Had Tutisani acted promptly upon receipt of the notice, and had the IJ then failed
to act, we would face a more difficult issue, but that is not what happened here. In fact,

3

DV-2005 winners are ineligible to receive diversity visas after September 30, 2005.
13

Tutisani’s counsel was aware of the applicable law on the adjustment of status issue.
App. 102-03. The IJ, when confronted with the impending expiration of Tutisani’s
eligibility, offered to address the matter in advance of the scheduled hearing on the last
day of eligibility, but counsel declined, because no application for adjustment of status
was ever filed. Therefore, Tutisani cannot establish that she was prejudiced by any
actions of the IJ with respect to the scheduling of a hearing on the adjustment of status
application.
Tutisani further contends that she would have requested voluntary departure
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (alien may be granted 120-day voluntary departure
period in lieu of being subject to proceedings regardless of how long she has been
physically present), had the hearing been scheduled sooner, and for this reason also the
IJ’s failure to act before September 30, 2005 constitutes a denial of due process.
However, the September 9, 2005 motion to advance the hearing made no mention
whatever of any application for voluntary departure. Furthermore, a request for voluntary
departure under section 1229c(a)(1) must be made prior to or at the master calendar
hearing, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)(1)(i)(A), and such a request would have had to have been
made well before notice of the hearing was mailed to counsel in April 2005. Tutisani
goes on to contend that, although an alien can request a 60-day voluntary departure period
at the conclusion of removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b), and she was
ineligible for this type of voluntary departure due to her lack of physical presence in the
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United States for one year prior to service of the Notice to Appear, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229c(b)(1)(A), the IJ could have at least granted voluntary departure to her husband
who had been present for years prior to the initiation of removal proceedings. But the
record discloses that her husband previously declined to apply for voluntary departure
because his wife and son were not also eligible. App. 331-32. We thus conclude that the
IJ did not deprive Tutisani of a fair opportunity to be heard on the voluntary departure
issue either.
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
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